After the war, the great defense contractors slowed down a bit, and the slow-down was provoked in good measure by a cut of the government budget. I think that some people felt that Eisenhower had been responsible for that slow-down and for what was called a gap in the missile defense. But as things turned around and there was an upswing, John von Neumann was drawn in as an advisor on an advisory committee, and he recommended that every defense contractor allot a certain percentage of the contract to advanced research. So here were these defense contractors, and I found myself asked to be a consultant to Convair and to general dynamics, and I've forgotten what else. But at any rate, the Convair group was steered by Marvin Stern, an imaginative and dynamic young man who later wrote a book with George Gamow called One, Two, Three, Infinity. But Marvin Stern knew that the Korean War presented special problems. And he thought that a committee should do a study on a doctrine for a limited war. So he got together Morgenstern and Chalmers Sherwin, who had been involved in airplane design, and Henry Kissinger and me. We met a day and a half, every month and a half, for a year and a half, in southern California, and we came up with this report on a doctrine for a limited war.